When evaluating the rationality of a player in a game one has to examine counterfactuals such as "what would happen if the player were to do what he does not do?" In this paper I develop a model of a normal form game where counterfactuals of this sort are evaluated as in the philosophical...

What if it could be possible to convince a completely non-neoclassical economist of the importance of Central Bank independence? The profession currently favors arguments in favor of Central Bank independence that are based on the seminal work by Barro and Gordon (1983 a,b), a model with...

Consider a two player game that is to be played once. The players receive information that they use to help them predict the choices made by each other. A decision rule for each player captures how each player uses the information received in making their choices. Priors in this context are...

Numeraire choice is often deemed a problem of purely analytical convenience. In this paper I show that there is more to numeraire selection than meets the eye for the formulation of monetary policy in countries with weak fiscal institutions. I show how (a) improper numeraire choice can...

In this paper I show that, just as with Nash Equilibrium, there are sparse conditions, not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead to (correlated) rationalizability. The basic observation is that, if the actual world belongs to a set of states where the set Z of action profiles is...

Suppose we know the utility function of a risk averse decision maker who values a risky prospect X at a price CE. Based on this information alone I develop upper bounds for the tails of the probabilistic belief about X of the decision maker. I also illustrate how to use these expected utility...

I show that the predictive content of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization critically depends on what the analyst knows about the details of the problem a particular decision maker faces. When the analyst does not know anything about the agentacute;s payoffs or beliefs and...

In this paper I prove a theorem that establishes bounds on the marginal rate of substitution between losing $x and winning $y, starting from wealth level $w for a risk averse individual that rejects a small stake gamble for a range of initial wealth levels. I am then able to prove a theorem that...