This note discusses the influence of state ownership on optimal export taxes. We demonstrate an invariance theorem: the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal export levels nor welfare nor the level of optimal trade taxes.

Whether vertical integration between a downstream oligopolist and an upstream oligopolist is profitable for an integrated pair of firms is shown to depend on whether one means by this that profits increase no matter what other firms do, that all integrated firms are better off when all firms are...

This note discusses the influence of state ownership on optimal export taxes. We demonstrate an invariance theorem: the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal export levels nor welfare nor the level of optimal trade taxes.

We consider an asymmetric polluting oligopoly. We demonstrate that optimal tax rates per unit of emission are not the same for all firms. We call this property selective penalization. Our Optimal Distortion Theorem states that the efficient tax structure requires that high cost firms pay a...

Key Features:Unique in its rich and comprehensive coverage of fields of applicationsBrings readers to the forefront of researchAn excellent complement to textbooks that cover differential games and dynamic optimization.

Presents a collection of research findings on topical issues in international trade theory and policy. This work deals with trade liberalization and outsourcing. It examines trading clubs and preferential trading agreements. It features six chapters on the various aspects of trade and aid.