This paper develops an expanded framework for social planning in which the existence of coercion is explicitly acknowledged. Key issues concern the precise definition of coercion for individuals and in the aggregate, its difference from redistribution, and its incorporation into normative...

This paper moves toward the formulation of a normative theory of taxation that incorporates collective choice as an essential element. Such a theory has many interesting parallels to optimal taxation, including large information requirements for political agents. The paper discusses possible...

A new view is emerging in the economic literature on how to analyze and interpret national and subnational revenue systems. Recent work has shown that such systems can be modelled successfully as sets of related policy instruments that are being shaped and used deliberately by vote-maximizing...

This article draws attention to the interdependence of regulation and taxation. The authors analyze the nature of policy equilibrium, as well as the implications of historically important political and economic shocks, for the joint use of the two policy instruments in a framework that embodies...