This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games. We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus...

We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nucleolus forms a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element. The above family is in general not a convex set, but path-connected

We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nucleolus form a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element, which is always a valuation (see p.43, Topkis (1998)). We give an explicit form of this valuation matrix. The above family is in general not a convex...

Playing three-person games can be very cumbersome without a good algorithm. This paper works out the algorithm to paly the Talmud bankruptcy game using Shapley's method in a simple Excel spreadsheet. The algorithm can be applied to any estate size, and consistency check is included

A highway problem is a cost sharing problem that arises if the common resource is an ordered set of sections with fixed costs such that each agent demands consecutive sections. We show that the core, the prenucleolus, and the Shapley value on the class of TU games associated with highway...

A weakening of covariance property for solutions of cooperative games with transferable utilities - self-covariance - is defined. Self-covariant solutions are positively homogenous and satisfy a "restricted" translation covariance such that feasible shifts are only the solution vectors...

We show that any transferable utility game can be represented by an assignment of facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost of the facilities. The intuitive solution in the representation turns out to be the Shapley value of the game, and thus...