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On cheating and whistleblowing
Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Loertscher, Simon - 2004
We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either … a unique Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies. We then add a whistleblowing stage, where the controller asks the …. Whistleblowing reduces the frequencies of cheating, is less costly in terms of test frequencies, and leads to a strict Pareto …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011417290
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On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing
Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Lörtscher, Simon - 2004
We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either … a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies. We then add a whistleblowing stage, where the controller asks the …. Whistleblowing reduces the frequencies of cheating, is less costly in terms of test frequencies, andleads to a strict Pareto …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077977
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Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
Auster, Sarah; Pavoni, Nicola - 2021
show that limited awareness of actions improves communication in such signalling games: the principal makes a coarser …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012418278
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Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns
Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017
In this paper, we consider a dynamic signaling model of an R&D market in which a researcher can choose either a safe project (exploitation) or a risky project (exploration) at each instance. We argue that there are substantial efficiency gains from rewarding minor innovations above their social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886
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Delegation and Information Revelation
Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - 2003
This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organisation where there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. We assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques a la Baron Myerson to elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151717
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Bayesian Persuasion by an Informed Mechanism Designer
Zhang, Jun; Chen, Yanlin - 2022
We investigate how an informed designer maximizes her objective when facinga player whose payoff depends on both the designer's private information andon an unknown state within the classical quasilinear environment. Thedesigner can disclose arbitrary information about the state via...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294529
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On cheating and whistleblowing
Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Lörtscher, Simon - 2004
We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either … a unique Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies. We then add a whistleblowing stage, where the controller asks the …. Whistleblowing reduces the frequencies of cheating, is less costly in terms of test frequencies, and leads to a strict Pareto …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011428761
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On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing
Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Lörtscher, Simon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either … a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies. We then add a whistleblowing stage, where the controller asks the …. Whistleblowing reduces the frequencies of cheating, is less costly in terms of test frequencies, and leads to a strict Pareto …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627937
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Level-k mechanism design
De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016 - This version: July 2016
Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723
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Incentives and Equilibrium in Agency with Adverse Selection
Faynzilberg, Peter S. - 2015
We show that contracting in agency with voluntary participation may involve incentives for the agent's abstention. Their provision alters the optimality criteria in the principal's decision-making, further distorts the mechanism, and may lead to breakdown of contracting in circumstances where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021575