We analyse the re-employment probabilities of almost 330,000 Spanish men aged 20-59 years who began a unemployment … insurance (UI) spell between February 1987 and November 1991 using data derived from the national unemployment benefit … administration database (SIPRE) and discrete time duration models with flexible baseline hazards. We show: (i) the level of UI …

sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics. We find that a vacancy referral increases …

sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics. We find that a vacancy referral increases …

sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics. We find that a vacancy referral increases …

unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We estimate multispell …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante threat of sanctions. Based on a large inflow sample into unemployment …