This paper extends the traditional analysis of the output effect under monopoly (third-degree) price discrimination to a multimarket oligopoly. The author shows that under oligopoly price discrimination, differences in competitive pressure, measured by the number of firms, across markets are...

This paper extends the traditional analysis of the output effect under monopoly (third- degree) price discrimination to a multimarket oligopoly. The author shows that under oligopoly price discrimination, differences in competitive pressure, measured by the number of firms, across markets are...

In this paper, we analyze the optimal regulation policy when the regulated firm has better information concerning the market demand than the regulator. We show that introducing a cost on public funds into the Planner's objective function does not lead to qualitative results similar to those...

This paper studies the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist that has private information about demand conditions. In particular, we consider the regulation of a two-product monopolist with interdependent demands when it has better information concerning the demand of one product than the...

In this paper we study the problem of how to regulate a monopolist whose costs are unknown to the regulator. The total cost incurred by the firm depends on the quantity produced, on the level of quality, which is observable and verifiable, as well as on some privately known technological...