We provide a tractable characterization of the sharp identification region of the parameters ø in a broad class of incomplete econometric models. Models in this class have set valued predictions that yield a convex set of conditional or unconditional moments for the observable model variables....

The common characteristic of R&D joint ventures between oligopolis- tic competitors, arms reduction talks, and study groups in law school is cooperation with rivals. Players benefit from cooperation, but any gain by their partner weakens their own position when competing for profits, security,...

We study the model of link formation that was introduced by Aumann and Myerson (1988) and focus on symmetric convex games with transferable utilities. We show that with at most five players the full cooperation structure results according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if the...

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...

Coordination problems are easily solved when there are clear and unambiguous signals. Institutional mechanisms that enhance the clarity of signals enables even cheap talk to work as a coordinating mechanism. On the other hand, learning about signals, especially if there is path-dependent noise...