Replaced with revised version of paper 08/03/05.

This paper explores the productivity and income distribution effects of asymmetric information and risk preferences on the credit market. A model of contract design in the presence of moral hazard is developed in which competitive, risk neutral lenders offer contracts to risk averse agents who...

The effective design and implementation of interventions that reduce vulnerability and poverty require a solid understanding of underlying poverty dynamics and associated behavioral responses. Stochastic and dynamic benefit streams can make it difficult for the poor to learn the value of such...

The availability of immigrant farm-workers from Mexico is a critical factor affecting the U.S. fresh fruit and vegetable sector. This paper uses retrospective panel data from rural Mexico to examine the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Immigration Reform and Control Act...

This article evaluates the performance of a rural credit market in Peru. We develop a model that shows that collateral requirements imposed by lenders in response to asymmetric information can lead not just to quantity rationing but also to transaction cost rationing and risk rationing. Just...

We develop a model that shows that asymmetric information can result in two types of credit rationing: conventional quantity rationing, and "risk rationing," whereby farmers are able to borrow but only under high-collateral contracts that offer them lower expected well-being than a safe,...