This paper (only available in Spanish) summarises the relevant literature in the field of vertical restraints in connection with retail markets and distribution, and provides some insights from Chilean practice

We provide a novel explanation for why manufacturers want to enforce a minimum resale price (min RPM) on retailers. A manufacturer sells her good via a multi-product retailer to final consumers by charging a linear wholesale price. The manufacturer then maximizes her profit through min RPM...

This paper examines the competitive effects of resale price maintenance (RPM) through inventory decisions under demand uncertainty. We focus on the Japanese publishing industry where RPM is allowed. We develop and estimate a model of RPM in which price and inventory are determined before demand...

This paper investigates two coordination mechanisms in a simple distribution channel: 1) the manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) and 2) the minimum advertised price (MAP). With a MSRP, the retailer can engage in a price discount policy to maintain control of the selling price. With a...

We present a model to explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price (min RPM) in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having non-contractible choice variables, which could represent the price of a substitute good and/or the effort the retailer exerts...

Resale price maintenance involves agreements between manufacturers and downstream distributors that set the downstream price of the product, either at a minimum price or a maximum price. Antitrust law, until recently, condemned these vertical price arrangements as illegal per se. The Supreme...

In many settings, behavioral economists have documented a price reference effect: the fact that a consumer's willingness to pay for a good is affected by difference between the observed price and the reference price they rationally expect. In this paper, we show that such preferences interact...