This paper reports laboratory data for a series of two-person games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment for which behavior conforms quite nicely to the...

Recent theoretical advances have dramatically increased the relevance of game theory for predicting human behavior in interactive situation. By relaxing the assumptions of perfect rationality and perfect foresight, we obtain much improved explanations of (i) initial decisions (ii)dynamic...

Standard laboratory posted-offer markets respond slowly and incompletely to demand shocks. In these one-sided markets, where sellers control the setting of prices, very little information is transmitted via the process of exchange. For this reason, traders have trouble distinguishing randomness...

The authors present a simple classroom game in which students are randomly designated as employers, purple workers, or green workers. This environment may generate “statistical†discrimination if workers of one color tend not to invest because they anticipate lower opportunities in the...

This paper reports a new experimental test of prospect theoryâ??s reflection effect. We conduct a sequence of experiments that allow us to directly compare choices under reflected gains and losses where real and hypothetical payoffs range from several dollars to over $100. Lotteries with...

Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of...