Private antitrust litigation often involves a dominant firm being accused of exclusionary conduct by a smaller rival. In such cases, the defendant generally has a much larger financial stake in the outcome. We explore the implications of this asymmetry in a model of litigation with endogenous...

The FTC and DOJ requested comments on their draft Vertical Merger Guidelines in January 2020. This article is a complete alternative set of suggested Vertical Merger Guidelines that reflects and supplements the approach explained in the comments submitted by the author along with Jonathan....

We present a model of ordered bargaining between one buyer and several sellers, with Nash bargaining at each stage. We first show that the model has the property that the buyer's payoff equals the expected utility of a weighted sum of independent Bernoulli random variables. We then exploit this...

This note describes the implementation of the hypothetical monopolist ssnip test for market definition in the context of merger cases where firms produce multiple differentiated products. The test developed here represents an extension and generalization of the Katz-Shapiro and...

This paper presents an economic framework for analyzing the competitive effects of partial ownership interests. The competitive effects of partial ownership depend critically on two separate and distinct elements: financial interest and corporate control. These two factors affect the incentives...

This article seeks an answer to a question that should be well settled: for purposes of antitrust analysis, what is 'market power' and/or 'monopoly power'? The question should be well settled because antitrust law requires proof of actual or likely market power or monopoly power to establish...

There is currently great intellectual ferment over the proper antitrust liability standard governing allegedly exclusionary conduct under Section 2. This article (which is forthcoming in the Antitrust Law Journal) focuses on the two main competing liability standards: the profit-sacrifice...

This Feature summarizes why and how vertical merger enforcement should be invigorated. In our modern market system, vigorous vertical merger enforcement is a necessity. Strong enforcement is particularly important in markets where economies of scale and network effects lead to barriers to entry...

This article analyzes my short proposal for reviewing and modifying merger consent decrees to permit additional relief if the provisions of the initial consent merger are found to fail to preserve or restore competition in a reasonable period of time after the merger was consummated. My proposal...