Price-level targeting (PLT) is optimal under the fully-informed rational expectations (FIRE) benchmark but lacks empirical support. Given the hurdles to the implementation of macroeconomic field experiments, we utilize a laboratory group experiment - where expectations are elicited from human...

We investigate learning in a repeated bank choice game, where agents first choose a bank to deposit in and then decide to withdraw that deposit or not. This game has a single Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, characterized by all agents depositing in the bank that offers the highest return,...

In this paper, we extend the individual evolutionary learning model by incorporating other-regarding considerations and apply the model to some Cournot games. Using the model fitted to the experimental data of a repeated 3-player Cournot game (with nonlinear cost and demand functions), we...

In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency and agents' behavior affect the efficiency of the market outcome. In particular, we are interested whether learning behavior with and without information about actions of other participants improves market efficiency. We...

In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency and agents' behavior affect the efficiency of the market outcome. In particular, we are interested whether learning behavior with and without information about actions of other participants improves market efficiency. We...