This paper provides a brief introduction to the economics of two-sided platforms and the implications for antitrust analysis.

Whose welfare should competition policy protect? That is the subject of the first two articles in our Autumn 2006 edition. The fact that a debate is even taking place over whether consumer or total (consumer plus producer) welfare is the right standard for competition policy is remarkable.

Firms with market power engage in a variety of business practices that harm their rivals. Under what circumstances should the antitrust laws condemn these practices because they will harm consumers?

The second issue of Competition Policy International begins with articles by two distinguished jurists representing both sides of the Atlantic.

Our fifth issue of <i>Competition Policy International</i> brings diverse fare from 29 leading economists and lawyers from the European Community and the United States.

In preparation for writing this paper, I re-read Robert Bork’s <i>The Antitrust Paradox</i>, and I thoroughly enjoyed doing so. Not because I agree with everything in it, though there is much with which to agree. And not only because I enjoy Judge Bork’s writing,...

Economic analysis of class certification has a different focus than economic analysis of most antitrust issues or, indeed, most legal issues.

Even though in such cases most economists would place more weight on methods of assessing the competitive impact of mergers that do not rely on market definition, courts generally view market definition as an essential component of the case.

Welcome to the first issue of Competition Policy International. This inaugural volume begins with a colloquy about tying, an unsettled area in both economics and law.

Our Autumn 2007 issue of <i>Competition Policy International</i> features a truly international collection of antitrust experts from the Asia-Pacific region, the European Union, and the United States.