Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties should locate at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain non-convergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including a competence and sociodemographic valance in...

1: Introduction -- 1.1. Rational Choice -- 1.2. The Theory of Social Choice -- 1.3. Restrictions on the Set of Alternatives -- 1.4. Structural Stability of the Core -- 2: Social Choice -- 2.1. Preference Relations -- 2.2. Social Preference Functions -- 2.3. Arrowian Impossibility Theorems --...

Sets, Relations and Preferences -- Linear Spaces and Transformations -- Topology and Convex Optimisation -- Differential Calculus and Smooth Optimisation -- Singularity Theory and General Equilibria -- Topology and Social Choice.

We develop a stochastic model of electoral competition in order to study the economic and political determinants of trade policy. We model a small open economy with two tradable goods, each of which is produced using a sector specific factor (e.g., land and capital) and another factor that is...

For over forty years, Douglass North has sought in his work to determine those conditions that favor economic growth. In his most recent writings he has emphasized the institutional innovations of the state and how these are often preceded, or accompanied, by transformations in beliefs and...

This paper defines a fine C1-topology for smooth preferences on a "policy space", W, and shows that the set of convex preference profiles contains open sets in this topology. It follows that if the dimension(W)\leqv(𝒟)-2 (where v(𝒟) is the Nakamura number of the voting rule, 𝒟), then...

Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties should locate at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain non-convergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including a competence and socio-demographic valance...