This paper moves toward the formulation of a normative theory of taxation that incorporates collective choice as an essential element. Such a theory has many interesting parallels to optimal taxation, including large information requirements for political agents. The paper discusses possible...

A new view is emerging in the economic literature on how to analyze and interpret national and subnational revenue systems. Recent work has shown that such systems can be modelled successfully as sets of related policy instruments that are being shaped and used deliberately by vote-maximizing...

This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion. Tax morale is interpreted as a social norm for tax compliance. The norm strength, depending on the share of evaders in the society, is endogenously derived. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative,...

Taxation theory rarely takes entrepreneurship into consideration. We discuss how this omission affects conclusions derived from standard models of capital taxation when applied to entrepreneurial income. Some of the defining features of entrepreneurship often omitted by standard capital taxation...

We analyze tax competition between large and asymmetric countries and derive conditions under which countries assist foreign authorities in collecting tax revenues via information exchange. It turns out that voluntary exchange of information is a Nash equilibrium between asymmetric countries,...