Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether informal monetary sanctions can lead to better coordination in a repeated minimum effort coordination game. While most groups first experience inefficient coordination, the efficiency increases substantially after introducing an ex post...

We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first contributor can be exploited by a second contributor. After playing this game the first contributor is allowed to punish the second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning...

In this paper we present results of an experimental study on the performance of three mechanisms which are designed to deal with non-point source pollution : collective fining, random fining, and a tax-subsidy scheme. Our results show that collective and random fining schemes do not induce the...

Im Februar 2006 hat die Bundesregierung ein Gesetz zur Verschärfung von Finanzkontrollen verabschiedet. Welche Rolle spielen Sanktionen im Kalkül von Steuerhinterziehern? Welche Kosten-Nutzen-Berechnungen stellen Steuerbetrüger an?

We analyze cooperative behavior of participants who faced a loss. In particular, we extend the Public Good Game by a fixed loss in the beginning of every period. We show that humans change their behavior compared to corresponding studies with gains only. First, in contrast to literature on...

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature, our firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm reports: reporting makes conviction only more likely, the...

In this paper we examine a class of local crimes that involve perfectly mobile criminals, and perfectly immobile criminal opportunities. We focus on local non-rival crime deterrence that is more efficient against criminals pursuing domestic crimes than criminals pursuing crimes elsewhere. In a...

The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa [Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2006). 'The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames', Economics Letters 90, pp. 116-121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is...

Arbeitslosengeld-II-Bezieher, die ohne wichtigen Grund nicht mit den Jobcentern kooperieren oder sich nicht hinreichend darum bemühen, eine Erwerbsarbeit oder Ausbildung aufzunehmen, müssen mit Sanktionen als Kürzungen ihrer Arbeitslosengeld- II-Leistungen für eine Dauer von drei Monaten...

This paper develops a model in which individuals gain social status among their peers for being 'tough' by committing violent acts. We show that a high penalty for moderately violent acts (zero-tolerance) may yield a double dividend in that it reduces both moderate and extreme violence. The...