Showing 51 - 60 of 43,041
We examine shareholder litigation and the price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. After the lawsuit filing, defendant firms pay higher loan spreads, up-front charges, experience more financial covenants, and are more likely to have a collateral requirement. These findings are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076634
in France whose rates are set by the government. Using administrative credit-registry and regulatory bank data, we find … that a one-percentage-point increase in funding costs reduces credit by 17%. To insulate their profits, banks reach for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013163182
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013169741
Firm prestige reduces the cost of bank loans. Specifically, when borrowers are included in Fortune's list of “America's Most Admired Companies” (MAC), their loan costs decline by approximately 13 bps or US$5.122 million, on average. The effect appears causal. The negative relation between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837157
This study examines whether the flow volatility experienced by institutional investors affects firms' financing costs. Using Greenwood and Thesmar's (2011) stock price fragility, a proxy for firm exposure to its institutional investors' flow volatility, we find that firms with high stock price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838891
trustworthiness is not associated with a firm's actual credit rating, bankruptcy score, debt covenant violations, financial report …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841598
Lending corruption is an important agency problem for banks. Using data from the World Bank Business Environmental Survey, we find that in countries with more lending corruption, banks give more favorable loan terms to borrowers. This relation is stronger when firms are under more financing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907312
We examine the contractual implications of lender trust in bank loan contracts. We measure a lender's trust using the average trust attitudes in the ancestral country of origin of its CEO. We find that banks with trusting CEOs charge lower loan rates. Furthermore, trusting lenders sanction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899252
This paper provides direct evidence that managerial style is a key determinant of the firm's cost of capital, in the context of private debt contracting. Applying the novel empirical method by Abowd, Karmarz, and Margolis (1999) to a large sample that tracks job movement of top managers, we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012869959
Agency theory predicts that the incentives for insiders to extract private benefits at the expense of creditors are negatively related to the level of ownership retained by insiders. However, the ability of insiders to effectively control the resources of the firm and engage in such activities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012973139