I consider the private provision of public goods in two stage games. If the agent who likes the public good least contributes first, the amount of the public good supplied will be the same as in the Nash equilibrium. If the agent who likes the public good most contributes first, less of the...

This paper was prepared for the conference ``Public Access to the Internet,'' JFK School of Government, May 26--27 , 1993. We describe some of the technology and costs relevant to pricing access to and usage of the Internet, and discuss the components of an efficient pricing structure. We...

This is a preliminary version of a paper prepared for the Tenth Michigan Public Utility Conference at Western Michigan University March 25--27, 1992. We describe the history, technology and cost structure of the Internet. We also describe a possible smart-market mechanism for pricing traffic on...

I examine the incentives for software providers to design appropriate user interfaces. There are two sorts of costs involved when one uses software: the fixed cost of learning to use a piece of software and the the variable cost of operating the software. For example menu driven software is easy...

As we indicated at the beginning of this chapter, price discrimination is a ubiquitous phenomenon. Nearly all firms with market power attempt to engage in some type of price discrimination. Thus, the analysis of the forms that price discrimination can take and the effects of price discrimination...