This paper updates the Demirgu?-Kunt and Sobaci (2001) cross-country deposit insurance database and extends it in several important dimensions. This new data set identifies both recent adopters and the ones that were not covered earlier due to a lack of data. Moreover, for the first time, it...

The degree of risk taking by a bank is related to the size of the gross subsidy that has been extended to the bank by the safety net. This subsidy can be calculated by applying a technique that models deposit insurance as a put option on the bank's assets

For optimal regulation, one size does not fit all. Differences in countries' informational and contracting environments (in the transparency of information, in protection for counterparties, and in political accountability), influence the design of their financial safety nets and their...

Explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability - the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. - Based on evidence for 61 countries in 1980-97, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache find that explicit deposit insurance tends to...

The behavior of actors in financial systems depends crucially on the incentives that motivate them. The right regulation, supervision, and incentives (including the scope of permissible activities, degree of contestability, and extent of safety net) for financial services can make the sector...