The core of a monotonic transferable utility (TU) game is shown to be the set of prices that incentivize each individual to demand the grand coalition in a market demand problem in which the goods being demanded are coalitions viewed as public goods. It is also shown that the core is the...

In Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem, an impartial observer determines a social ordering of the lotteries on the set of social alternatives based on a sympathetic but impartial concern for all individuals in society. This ordering is derived from a more primitive ordering on the set of all...

In this article, the kinds of utility comparisons that can be made may differ in distinct population subgroups. Within each subgroup,utility is either ordinally or cardinally measurable. Levels and differences of utility may or may not be interpersonally comparable within a subgrouputility is...

This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare...

An Introduction to Social Ethics and Normative Economics -- Kolm as a Contributor to Public Utility Pricing, Second-Best Culture, and the Theory of Regulation -- Public Utility Pricing and Capacity Choice with Stochastic Demand -- Bidimensional Inequalities with an Ordinal Variable -- Inequality...

Sen?s social-evaluation-functional framework is used to reformulate Harsanyi?s social aggregation problem so that both single-profile and multi-profile issues can be considered with allowance made for different assumptions concerning the measurability and comparability of individual utilities....