This paper analyzes the problem of competitive bidding (via sealed tenders) under uncertainty when one of the parties knows the value of the prize with certainty. A real problem of this type has been reported in a case study by Woods. The equilibrium strategies are derived and characterized for...

This paper analyses competitive bidding via sealed tenders for the case in which the bidders have different sources and amounts of information available about the value of the prize. The equilibrium pure strategies are characterized and computational methods are derived. A simple example is...

This paper provides a mathematical framework for modeling demand and determining optimal price schedules in markets which have demand externalities and can sustain nonlinear pricing. These fundamental economic concepts appear in the marketplace in the form of mutual buyers' benefits and quantity...

A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subset that is stable in the sense defined by Kohlberg and Mertens. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to adjoining redundant strategies and the other is a strong version of...