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What happens if A wants to buy a good or service from B, but not all relevant characteristics can be fixed in a contract? This book gives a non-technical overview of various models dealing with this situation. Particular emphasis is put on the problem that the service includes various tasks and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013519359
Psychologists claim that being treated kindly puts individuals in a positive emotional state: they then treat an unrelated third party more kindly. Numerous experiments document that subjects indeed 'pay forward' specific behavior. For example, they are less generous after having experienced...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014241932
How does the environment of an organization infuence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bu- reaucrat, who supplies some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761218
In multiple-task hidden-action models, the (mis-)allocation of effort may play an important role for benefit creation. Signals which capture this benefit and which are used in incentive schemes should thus not only be judged by the noise and the associated costs but also by the mis-allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761834
This article considers a wide class of censoring problems and presents a construction rule for an objective function. This objective function generalises the ordinary likelihood as well as particular "likelihoods" used for estimation in several censoring models. Under regularity conditions the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761880
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761912
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762122