Before solving the capacity-pricing game for oligopoly, Boccard and Wauthy (2000) argue that, as under duopoly, at a mixed-strategy equilibrium of the pricing game the largest firm's payoff equals the Stackelberg follower profit. We point to a nontrivial mistake in their argument and see how...

This note analyzes the repeated interaction among buyers of a homogeneous good, in a setting of imperfect buyer mobility. The buyers are assumed to play a dynamic game of imperfect information: at each stage every buyer chooses which seller to visit without knowing the current and past choices...

We examine a Bertrand-Edgeworth model of competition in a labour market where the workers simultaneously set wages disregarding any influence their current decision may have on opponents' future decisions. The iterated best response process is shown to converge in finite time to a Bertrand-Nash...

This paper incorporates imperfect divisibility of money in a price game where a given number of identical firms produce a homogeneous product at constant unit cost up to capacity. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Unlike in the...

The paper extends the analysis of price competition among capacity-constrained sellers beyond the cases of duopoly and symmetric oligopoly.We first provide some general results for the oligopoly and then focus on the triopoly, providing a complete characterization of the mixed strategy...

The paper extends the analysis of price competition among capacity-constrained sellers beyond the cases of duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. We first provide some general results for the oligopoly and then focus on the triopoly, providing a complete characterization of the mixed strategy...

Recent contributions have explored how lack of buyer mobility affects pricing. For example, Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) envisage a two-stage game where, once prices are set by the firms, the buyers play a static game by choosing independently which firm to visit. We incorporate imperfect...

Strategic market interaction is modelled as a two-stage game where potential entrants choose capacities and active firms compete in prices or quantities. Due to capital indivisibility, the capacity choice is made from a finite grid. In either strategic setting, the equilibrium of the game...

We analyze a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in homogeneous product industry, under effcient rationing, constant marginal cost until full capacity utilization, and identical technology across firms. We solve for the equilibrium and establish its uniqueness for capacity configurations in the mixed...