We consider a homogeneous product market where, given their capacities, existing firms compete in prices. First, pricing at the constant short-run average-marginal cost - i. e., Bertrand outcome - is shown to be a Nash equilibrium of the static price game provided total capacity is sufficiently...

This paper formalizes, for the labor market, the traditional view that competition among the sellers leads to a fall in prices so long as there is excess supply. First we show that, at a Nash equilibrium of the one-period game, wages are set equal to the Walrasian wage. Then, similarly as in...

This note analyzes the repeated interaction among buyers of a homogeneous good, in a setting of imperfect buyer mobility. The buyers are assumed to play a dynamic game of imperfect information: at each stage every buyer chooses which seller to visit without knowing the current and past choices...

We analyze a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in a homogeneous product industry, under efficient rationing and constant (and identical across firms) marginal cost until full capacity utilization. We solve for the unique equilibrium in a subset of the no pure strategy equilibrium region of the capacity...

This note analyzes the repeated interaction among buyers of a homogeneous good, in a setting of imperfect buyer mobility. The buyers are assumed to play a dynamic game of imperfect information: at each stage every buyer chooses which seller to visit without knowing the current and past choices...

Before solving a two-stage capacity and pricing game for oligopoly, Boccard and Wauthy (2000) argue that, as under duopoly, at a mixed strategy equilibrium of the pricing game the largest firm's expected profit is the profit accruing to it as a Stackelberg follower when the rivals supply their...

Recent contributions have explored how lack of buyer mobility affects pricing. For example, Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) envisage a two-stage game where, once prices are set by the firms, the buyers play a static game by choosing independently which firm to visit. We incorporate imperfect...

Strategic market interaction is modelled as a two-stage game where potential entrants choose capacities and active firms compete in prices or quantities. Due to capital indivisibility, the capacity choice is made from a finite grid. In either strategic setting, the equilibrium of the game...

This paper incorporates imperfect divisibility of money in a price game where a given number of identical firms produce a homogeneous product at constant unit cost up to capacity. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Unlike in the...