Andreoni (1998) shows that a small amount of seed money from the government can generate substantial additional private donations toward the provision of a public good, when there is a threshold level of provision below which no benefits are achieved. We argue that Andreoni's solution can be...

<link rid="b9">Esteban and Ray (2001)</link> model an increasing marginal cost of effort in providing a public good. If the marginal cost of contribution function has an elasticity greater than 1, then the level of provision is increasing in group size, regardless of the degree of rivalry of the public good. We...

We analyze the effect of group size on public good provision under the <link rid="b8">Morgan (2000)</link> lottery mechanism. For a pure public good, the lottery performs quite well as public good provision is found to increase in group size, even when the lottery prize is held constant. By contrast, for fully rival...

We show that the presumed incompatibility of uncoordinated R&D and competition is not fundamental, but hinges on the nature of R&D spillovers. As a consequence, R&D subsidies may be more effective than previously thought.

The Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) introduced by Anderson and Neary (1994) provided the first theoretically satisfying measure of a country's tariff structure by overcoming the problem of ad hoc specification of indexing weights and the related index number problem. We observe, however, that...

We characterize asymmetric equilibria in two-stage process innovation games and show that they are prevalent in the different models of R&D technology considered in the literature. Indeed, cooperation in R&D may be accompanied by high concentration in the product market. We show that while such...