requires reasonably accurate public information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production … willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group … reciprocity in teams. -- team production ; public good ; monitoring ; punishment ; experiment …

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We … show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members … identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks …

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We … show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members … identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks …