We study the strategic utilization of storage in imperfect electricity markets. We apply a game-theoretic Cournot model to the German power market and analyze different counterfactual and realistic cases of pumped hydro storage. Our main finding is that both storage utilization and...

An important conclusion from the literature on hydropower is that if there are no other constraints than the available water reservoirs for a year, and operating costs are ignored, the competitive (and socially optimal) outcome is characterized by the (present value) price being constant through...

The costs of energy supply disruptions for industrialised economies go well beyond the economic measures of national accounts. According to different kinds of risks, physical shortages or price shocks, there are several categories of negative effects. Oil disruptions have both a direct and an...

Since oil is a non-renewable resource with a high environmental impact, and its most common use is to produce combustibles for electricity, reliable methods for modelling electricity consumption can contribute to a more rational employment of this hydrocarbon fuel. In this paper we apply the...

Adequate extension of electricity transmission networks is required for integrating fluctuating renewable energy sources, such as wind power, into electricity systems. We study the performance of different regulatory approaches for network expansion in the context of realistic demand patterns...

Producers submit committed supply functions to a procurement auction, e.g. an electricity auction, before the uncertain demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium(SFE), every firm chooses the bid maximizing his expected profit given the bids of the competitors. In case of...

Most balaning markets of electric power are organized as uniform-price auctions. In 2001, the balancing market of England and Wales switched to a pay-as-bid auction with the intention of reducing wholesale electricity prices. Numerical simultations of an electricity auction model have indicated...

In a real-time electric power auction, the bids of producers consist of committed supply as a function of price. The bids are submitted under uncertainty, before the demand by the Independent System Operator has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every producer chooses the...

This paper derives a Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) of a pay-as-bid auction, also called discriminatory auction. Such an auction is used in the balancing market for electric power in Britain. For some probability distributions of demand a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. If demand...