Showing 141 - 150 of 187
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001387323
This paper considers the implications of international policy coordination when both monetary and fiscal policy choices are endogenous. We show that a movement from insular monetary commitment to international monetary policy coordination will, if fiscal policies are not coordinated, produce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005715183
We consider a standard two-country monetary policy game with fixed nominal wage contracts. The policy regime is either non-cooperative or cooperative. We extend conventional analyses by deriving the natural rate of employment endogenously through monopoly union decision-making. As unions attempt...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005715216
We demonstrate that in important cases Propositions 3 and 4 in Eijffinger, Hoeberichts, and Schaling (2000) may fail. Moreover, their monetary policy delegation arrangement, which advocates that central banker preference uncertainty may be desirable, is dominated by other arrangements without...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005814154
We show that accommodation policies may render efficient bargaining in the labour market unsustainable as a perfect Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. In fact, in the eyes of the labour market participants, efficient bargaining may be Pareto-dominated by the monopoly-union...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008520580
So far, the 'New Open Economy Macroeconomics' literature has primarily focused on monetary policy and monetary policy rules, rather than paying attention also to fiscal policy. This is an omission because, especially with the advent of EMU, the burden on fiscal policy as an instrument for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123984
According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is desirable. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model emphasizing forward-looking private sector behaviour. Transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank's future policy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124118
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005068155
We consider the political economy of a monetary union wheremember governments attempt to influence the policy of the commoncentral bank. Modeling this as a common agency with incentivecontracts, we show that if incentives are all that matters for the bank,the equilibrium implements a weighted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094419
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005095335