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Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations

Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Velzen, Bas van - In: Special issue on MCQT'10 : methodological advances in …, (pp. 507-520). 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010217405

The core cover in relation to the nucleolus and the weber set

Quant, Marieke; Borm, Peter; Reijnierse, Hans; Velzen, … - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 33 (2005) 4, pp. 491-503

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003229538

Compromise stable TU-games

Quant, Marieke; Borm, Peter; Reijnierse, Hans; Velzen, … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001784497

A bargaining set based on external and internal stability and endogenous coalition formation

Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Teeuwen, Geert; … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003303504

Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems

Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, … - 2014

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractually exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373726