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borrowers likely involve fewer monitoring tools and weaker control rights. We evaluate these explanations of cov-lite contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012995760
Contracting outside the formal legal system is commonplace, be it among diamond dealers, whalers, or Maghribi traders. Parties' ex-ante willingness to enter into contracts depends crucially on whether the available extralegal consequences for breach are sufficiently severe. While economic and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012981224
borrowers likely involve fewer monitoring tools and weaker control rights. We evaluate these explanations of cov-lite contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012967375
Gaming is an important problem when firms use a nonlinear incentive contract. Previous empirical researches show that … is higher when the employee is more productive. Moreover, we compare a liner contract and a quota-based contract and show … that even when an employee can game the incentive system,a quota-based contract is more profitable than a linear contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012862276
We present a simple mechanism that can be implemented in a simple experiment. In a modified trust game, the allocator can offer to pay the investor to cooperate. The mechanism is successful at implementing efficient outcomes: participants manage to achieve an efficient outcome, when this is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014193169
unique. If only the contribution levels are contractible, then investments are suboptimally small if the contract is short … term or close to its expiration date. To encourage investments, the optimal contract is more ambitious if it is short term … possible, such an incomplete contract implements the first-best. The framework helps to analyse emissions, investments, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014193646
We consider an infinitely repeated reappointment game in a principal-agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government-public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014152779
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014231474
-it-or-leave-it contracts to the retailers, with that of a bargaining game, in which the firms bilaterally negotiate contract terms via a … Stackelberg or bargaining critically affects firms’ preferences over contract types and thus their equilibrium contract choices …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014039995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013383687