This paper analyzes the interaction between two political economy decisions by a government: whether to privatize a public firm and what environmental policy to choose (an environmental tax or an emission standard). We find that when market competition is weak the government does not privatize...

The purpose of this paper is to study how the choice of environmental standards by governments is affected by the existence of wage incomes when firms' location is endogenous. In developed countries labor is unionized, which allows positive wage incomes to arise. Thus, each government has...

The literature on mixed oligopoly does not consider the strategic interaction between governments when they decide whether to privatize their publicly-owned firms. In order to analyze this question, we consider two countries and assume that publicly-owned firms are less efficient than private...

This paper analyses the organisation of wage bargaining in multiproduct firms since it affects the distribution of power between workers and firms. We assume that each firm has two plants and chooses who bargains the wage with the workers: either the head of the firm or the manager of each...