As documented in the dynamics and outcomes, agents learn to attach meaning to a priori meaningless messages. For the common interest game, Game 1, this chapter observe the efficient separating outcome, although the learning process is gradual. For the partial common interest game, Game 2, the...

We experimentally investigate coordination games in which cognition plays an important role, i.e., where outcomes are affected by the agents level of understanding of the game and the beliefs they form about each others' understanding. We ask whether and when repeated exposure permits agents to...

In common-interest spatial-dispersion games, the agents common goal is to choose distinct locations. We experimentally investigate the role of cognition in such games and compare it with the role of cognition in spatial matching games. In our setup, cognition matters because agents may be...

Stimulus-response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) models are estimated with experimental data from sender-receiver games and compared using the Davidson and MacKinnon P-test for non-nested hypotheses. Depending on a certain adjustment parameter, the P-test favors the SR model, the BBL model...

This paper compares stimulus response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) using data from experiments with sender-receiver games. The environment, extensive form games played in a population setting, is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games. Both the SR and BBL models fit the...

This paper uses experiments to investigate the evolution of communication. We consider simple games of information transmission in which the interests of senders and receivers are imperfectly aligned. We show that under four canonical incentive conditions the no-communication hypothesis can be...