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Family Firms
Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto; Shleifer, Andrei - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 58 (2003) 5, pp. 2167-2202
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006554357
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Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection
Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto - In: Journal of financial intermediation 15 (2006) 1, pp. 1-31
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007095774
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FAMILY FIRMS
Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto; Shleifer, Andrei - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006975245
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Family Firms
Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto; Shleifer, Andrei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123762
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Family Firms
Shleifer, Andrei; Panunzi, Fausto; Burkart, Mike - Financial Markets Group - 2002
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005073849
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Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection
Panunzi, Fausto; Burkart, Mike - Financial Markets Group - 2001
This paper analyses the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and outside ownership concentration. Legal protection affects both the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholders incentives to monitor. Because of this latter effect and its repercussion on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005073876
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Family Firms
Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto; Shleifer, Andrei - In: Journal of Finance 58 (2003) 5, pp. 2167-2202
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005691270
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Family firms
Shleifer, Andrei; Panunzi, Fausto; Burkart, Mike - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2002
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745376
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Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection
Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2001
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and outside ownership concentration. Legal protection a¤ects both the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because of this latter e¤ect and its repercussion on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071555
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Family Firms
Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto; Shleifer, Andrei - Harvard Institute of Economic Research (HIER), … - 2002
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478770