In this paper we examine whether publishing the information underlying the central bank's decisions is socially desirable. We show that opacity may lead to the same equilibrium as transparency. However, additional equilibria may emerge under opacity with adverse consequences for welfare....

This paper aims at assessing the relevance of communicating central bank's forecasts to the private sector under discretionary monetary policy. In a New Keynesian environment, the central bank and the private sector have different information sets. The private sector uses the central bank's...

Conventional wisdom says that commitment eliminates the inflationary bias of monetary policy. However, this paper shows that the inflation bias can persist even when the central bank commits. A simple model is presented in which the central bank precommits by setting the policy instrument, and...

We examine how the transparency of the European Central Bankś monetary policy affects the amount of trust that the citizens of the European Union have in this institution. We use nearly half a million individual responses from the European Commissionś Eurobarometer survey from 2000-2011 and...