This paper studies revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is inter-bidders resale, where the winner in the...

We consider a symmetric three-stage game played by a pair of regulator-firm hierarchies to capture the scale and technology effects. Each firm produces one good sold on the market. The production process generates pollution characterized by a fixed emission/output ratio, and cross-borders. Firms...

The first part of the paper reports the results from a sequence of laboratory experiments comparing the bidding behavior for multiple contracts in three different sealed bid auction mechanisms; first-price simultaneous, first-price sequential and first-price combinatorial bidding. The design of...

We study sealed-bid auctions with financial externalities, i.e., auctions in which losers' utilities depend on how much the winner pays. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB), larger financial externalities result in lower bids and in a lower expected...

This paper examines the effect of competition on the irreversible investment decisions under uncertainty as a generalization of the "real option" approach. We examine this issue with reference to an industry where each firm has only one investment opportunity which is completely irreversible and...

Short-term auctions for access to entry terminals of the British gas-network appear to successfully allocate scarce resources and capture scarcity rent. Now long-term auctions are being introduced to guide future capacity expansion decisions. In our model the fraction of rights issued in the...

Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on offer change...

Technological development is likely to play an important role in curbing growth in greenhouse gas emissions. It is therefore important to incorporate factors influencing technological change in climate policy analyses. This paper studies climate policy when there are technology spillovers...

We consider an auction setting in which potential buyers, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second-price auction in a symmetric information framework. First, we...