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When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCG-like payment rules will not ensure truthfulness). We...
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We performed controlled experiments of human participants in a continuous sequence of ad auctions, similar to those used by Internet companies. The goal of the research was to understand users' strategies in making bids. We studied the behavior under two auction types: (1) the Generalized...
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We study environments with m homogenous items and two bidders, where the private information of each bidder consists of a monotone valuation (multi-unit auctions). We analyze ex-post implementable social choice functions where the dominant strategy of a bidder is to reveal his valuation.
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We consider dynamic auction mechanisms for the allocation of multiple items. Items are identical, but have different expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. Buyers are of dynamic nature, and arrive and depart over time. Our goal is to design mechanisms that maximize...
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Maximizing the revenue from selling two goods (or items) is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the single-good case. We show that simple "one-dimensional" mechanisms, such as selling the two goods separately, guarantee at least 73% of the optimal revenue when the valuations of...
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We consider the complexity of finding a Correlated Equilibrium in an n-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries for players' utilities at pure strategy profiles. Many randomized regret-matching dynamics are known to yield an approximate correlated equilibrium quickly: in...
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The Gale-Shapely algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem is known to take \Theta(n^2) steps to find a stable marriage in the worst case, but only \Theta(n log n) steps in the average case (with n women and n men). In 1976, Knuth asked whether the worst-case running time can be improved in a...
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