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The survey is focused on the typical problems in information transmission from experts to non-experts. Attention is paid to the factors that can affect information disclosure in models that apply a game-theoretic approach to the use of professional advice. In the economic literature expertise is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010728141
For strategic communication games à la Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50:1431–1451, <CitationRef CitationID="CR3">1982</CitationRef>) the paper shows that under some prior beliefs different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988736
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The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008032
The paper surveys theoretical models of job mobility with special attention to promotion and career profiles. The review is ordered according to the assumptions concerning information on workers' relevant characteristics (i.e. perfect vs. imperfect information, private vs. public information)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005215209
The paper is concerned with the interaction between two agents: an expert, announcing his probability that a particular state of the world will occur, and a non-expert decision-maker, who takes action according to his posterior beliefs. The decision-maker considers the expert an experiment of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230933
Two agents are engaged in a joint activity that yields a common perperiod payoff at two rounds of play. The expert announces the probability that the current state of the world is low, instead of high, at each stage. Having received the report of the expert, the decision-maker takes action at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008828403
The paper is concerned with instructions as a way of setting premises for subsequent decisions in models of teams à la Marschak-Radner, under information diversification. The paper suggests that instructions can bridge people’s differences in knowledge: they do not require mutual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570323