The right to equal treatment, irrespective of age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status and place of residence, is an important principle for several health care systems. A reform of the Norwegian hospital sector of 2002 may be used as a relevant experiment for investigating whether...

We analyse how payment systems for GPs and hospital specialists affect patients' inequalities in healthcare treatments, referrals, and health. We present a model of contracting between a purchaser and a GP and a hospital specialist, with patients differing in severity and socioeconomic status....

The Norwegian health care system is semi-decentralized. Primary care and long-term care (LTC) are the responsibilities of the municipalities. Specialist care is the responsibility of the central government and is organised through four Regional Health Authorities (RHA). Resource use, health...

We apply the stochastic evolutionary approach of equilibrium selection tomacroeconomic models in which a complementarity at the macro level ispresent. These models often exhibit multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria,and the best response-correspondence of an individual increases with ameasure...

We apply the stochastic evolutionary approach of equilibrium selection to macroeconomic models in which a complementarity at the macro level is present. These models often exhibit multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria, and the best response-correspondence of an individual increases with a...

Incentive contracts must typically be based on performance measures that do not exactly match agents’ true contribution to principals’ objectives. Such misalignment may impose difficulties for effective incentive design. We analyze to what extent implicit dynamic incentives such as career...

We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is veri?able (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2). We show that the power of the incentive scheme...

"Incentive contracts must typically be based on performance measures that do not exactly match the agents' true contribution to the principals' objectives. Such misalignment may pose difficulties for effective incentive design. We analyze the extent to which implicit dynamic incentives, such as...