We study optimal incentive contracts offered to teams where team members feel a social pressure to exert similar effort levels. The team consists of two groups of agents differing in their productivity. We characterize first best and the equilibrium under agency. Regarding economic incentives,...

The right to equal treatment, irrespective of age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status and place of residence, is an important principle for several health care systems. A reform of the Norwegian hospital sector of 2002 may be used as a relevant experiment for investigating whether...

The Norwegian health care system is semi-decentralized. Primary care and long-term care (LTC) are the responsibilities of the municipalities. Specialist care is the responsibility of the central government and is organised through four Regional Health Authorities (RHA). Resource use, health...

We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed in recent evolutionary literature to a class of coordination games played simultaneously by the entire population. In these games payoffs, and hence best replies, are determined by a summary statistic of the population strategy profile. We...

We apply the stochastic evolutionary approach of equilibrium selection tomacroeconomic models in which a complementarity at the macro level ispresent. These models often exhibit multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria,and the best response-correspondence of an individual increases with ameasure...

"Incentive contracts must typically be based on performance measures that do not exactly match the agents' true contribution to the principals' objectives. Such misalignment may pose difficulties for effective incentive design. We analyze the extent to which implicit dynamic incentives, such as...