We study the impact of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician-patient relationship. In a market for credence goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physicians act as experts. Due to their informational advantage, physicians have an incentive to cheat by inducing...

The structure of the German economy changed drastically over time. The decline of the proportion of gross value added of the manufacturing sector at the expense of the services sector is often cited as an indicator for this structural change. However, this shift is not necessarily an indication...

Die Struktur der deutschen Wirtschaft hat sich in der Vergangenheit stark gewandelt. Als Indikator für diesen Strukturwandel wird oftmals der langjährige Rückgang des Wertschöpfungsanteils der Industrie zugunsten der Dienstleistungen angeführt, die einen immer größeren Teil der...

We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...