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The intensity of incentives in firms and markets : moral hazard with envious agents
Bartling, Björn; Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2006
. We offer an explanation for this observation based on envy among agents in an otherwise standard moral hazard model with …. The necessary compensation for expected envy renders incentive provision more expensive, which generates a tendency … towards flat-wage contracts. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that social comparisons like envy are more pronounced among …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343950
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The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents
Bartling, Björn; Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2006
. We offer an explanation for this observation based on envy among agents in an otherwise standard moral hazard model with …. The necessary compensation for expected envy renders incentive provision more expensive, which generates a tendency … towards flat-wage contracts. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that social comparisons like envy are more pronounced among …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427455
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The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets : Moral Hazard With Envious Agents
Bartling, Björn; von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2011
utility losses if others receive higher wages. We analyze the impact of envy on optimal incentive contracts in a general moral … hazard model and isolate the countervailing effects of envy on the costs of providing incentives. We show that envy creates a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058880
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The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents
Bartling, Björn; von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2006
. We offer an explanation for this observation based on envy among agents in an otherwise standard moral hazard model with …. The necessary compensation for expected envy renders incentive provision more expensive, which generates a tendency … towards flat-wage contracts. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that social comparisons like envy are more pronounced among …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333780
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The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents
Bartling, Björn; Siemens, Ferdinand von - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
. We offer an explanation for this observation based on envy among agents in an otherwise standard moral hazard model with …. The necessary compensation for expected envy renders incentive provision more expensive, which generates a tendency … towards flat-wage contracts. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that social comparisons like envy are more pronounced among …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187313
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The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents
Bartling, Björn; Siemens, Ferdinand von - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
. We offer an explanation for this observation based on envy among agents in an otherwise standard moral hazard model with …. The necessary compensation for expected envy renders incentive provision more expensive, which generates a tendency … towards flat-wage contracts. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that social comparisons like envy are more pronounced among …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785929
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The intensity of incentives in firms and markets : moral hazard with envious agents
Bartling, Björn; Siemens, Ferdinand A. von - In: Labour economics : official journal of the European … 17 (2010) 3, pp. 598-607
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008647673
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You don't always get what you pay for
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592884
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Limited liability and the trade-off between risk and incentives
Kräkel, Matthias - 2007
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383029
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Limited Liability and the Trade-off between Risk and Incentives
Kräkel, Matthias - 2007
everal empirical findings have challenged the traditional trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263185