Using the arguments of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek, I argue that private ownership solves the economic problem of corruption. Since private ownership discourages entrepreneurs from rent-seeking, and privately owned media provide objective and unbiased information to citizens,...

We present a model of parallel redistribution system to explain the problem of corruption. Within this model we synthesize both agency theory and rent-seeking. More precisely, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and...

This paper shortly surveys theoretical and empirical literature related to regulatory capture in railway industry. In the first section, the survey summarizes the main contributions to the general theoretical framework referred to as the theory of regulation or the regulatory capture theory....

Economic theories of the last decades provide analytical framework within which we can explain institutional conditions for corrupt action. Specialists making economic policy recommendations to resolve this problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are rent-seeking and agency...

Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Classical political economists argue that corruption undermines the rule of law (Smith 2001, chap 5). The modern Public Choice proponents argue that corruption and lobbying might influence the efficiency of the rule of law. While Chicago Public Choice...

Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Classical political economists argue that corruption undermines the rule of law (Smith 2001, chap 5). The modern Public Choice proponents argue that corruption and lobbying might influence the efficiency of the rule of law. While Chicago Public Choice...

I develop a new and original theoretical concept of productive and destructive institutional entrepreneurship that explains institutional change as being the result of entrepreneurial decision-making. I argue that William Baumol’s (1990) classification of productive, unproductive, and...