The present paper analyses different formulations of individual rights within a traditional social choice-theoretic framework and a game form framework. It proposes a theory of social situations as a basis for some new formulations of individual rights that better incorporates some positive...

The paper claims that the Monotone Consistency condition utilized by Baigent in his proof of the impossibility theorem is too strong. We factorize this condition into two different weaker conditions and show that they are inconsistent with some variants of the Simple Uncertainty Aversion and the...

The paper presents an axiomatic analysis of opportunity ranking within a logical framework. It establishes that any opportunity or freedom ranking is completely determined by a subjacent logical chain that is interpreted as a freedom standard. However, a preferential interpretation of the chain...

The paper applies a technique developed in artificial intelligence to frame and analyze on the foundational level A. Sen's critique of internal consistency conditions in various choice situations.

The paper applies a technique developed in artifical intelligence to frame and analyze on the foundational level Sen’s critique of internal consistency conditions in various choice situations

Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. In this paper we argue...