Expanding the number of U.S. district judgeships is often justified as a response to expanding caseloads. Increasing judgeships during unified government, however, allows Congress and the President to engage in political (patronage and ideological) control of the federal district courts. This...

This paper examines the theoretical promise of e-rulemaking with an examination of data about all filings at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from 1999 to 2004. The paper first reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on e-rulemaking. It then analyzes a dataset of all filings...

This paper examines the effect of judicial ideology on the selection and outcome of telecommunications regulatory cases. Using a dataset on Federal Communications Commission orders and trials from 1990 to 1995, this paper shows that changes in the make-up of the bench of the D.C. Circuit Court...

Even in the wake of the most sweeping campaign finance reform law to be enacted in three decades, further significant reform is inevitable. Special interest money continues to flow through loopholes in the Act, and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund is near collapse. The next reform should...

In this paper, we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy-buying, but are rather a form of political participation and consumption. We summarize the data on campaign spending, and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals, not...

In this paper we consider a number of experiments to determine whether aspiring managers can solve non-market strategy problems. Conducting a survey of nearly 300 MBA students, we show that with simple, single-stage problems, managers are very competent in reaching the optimal choice given their...

One of the central concerns about American policy-making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal - is extensive, there is...

This paper examines the amount and organization (individual vs. collective) of lobbying by firms in administrative agencies. It explores the power and limitations of the collective-action theories and transaction-cost theories in explaining lobbying. It introduces a dataset of over 900 lobbying...

This paper examines the amount and organization of lobbying (internal organization vs. trade association) by firms in administrative agencies. It explores the power and limitations of the collective action theories and transaction cost theories in explaining lobbying. It introduces a dataset of...

This paper introduces the special issue on lobbying of "Business and Politics." It explains why the source of real influence in politics is not money or campaign finance contributions. Rather, the paper argues that lobbying and information provision by interest groups to politicians is a much...