This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule.

We propose a simple theoretical model of supervised learning that is potentially useful to interpret a number of empirical phenomena. The model captures a basic tradeoff between sheltering the child from the consequences of his mistakes, and allowing him to learn from experience. We characterize...

Dynamic consistency leads to Bayesian updating under expected utility. We ask what it implies for the updating of more general preferences. In this paper, we characterize dynamically consistent update rules for preference models satisfying ambiguity aversion. This characterization extends to...

The assumption that decision makers choose actions to maximize their preferences is a central tenet in economics. This assumption is often justied either formally or informally by appealing to evolutionary arguments. In contrast, we show that in almost every game and for almost every family of...

This paper investigates the possibility that wealth (holdings of money) serves as a signal of ability to produce high quality products for agents who cannot directly observe the quality of the products. A producer's wealth may advertise past success in selling products to agents who knew the...

We study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private signals about the objects. value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this...

We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suþer from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes;...

This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...

This paper illustrates the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is...