We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The … institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we … observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the …

We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The … institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we … observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the …

We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The … institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we … observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the …

We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The … institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we … observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the …

Theoretical and empirical studies have generally weighed the effect of peer punishment and pool punishment for … both cooperation and peer punishment. To make the commitment credible, we assume that those willing to commit have to make … punishment and the stability of pool punishment and that the replicator dynamics lead to transitions of different systems: pool …