matching mechanism is also rematching proof or strong equilibrium for all stable matching mechanisms. This result shows that … there is no difference among all stable matching mechanisms in rematching proof or strong equilibria in truncations, which …

We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between … congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of … choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students and among schools is also sizeable in all …

admit students that tend to struggle elsewhere. Most of the impact of alternative evaluation is found to be due to their … explained by their impact on sorting and not because they allow programs to select more successful students from a given pool of …

. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong … incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new … manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools …

The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi … students to learn about universities and accepting a university that turns out to be inferior causes regret. We discuss and …

The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi … students to learn about universities and accepting a university that turns out to be inferior causes regret. We discuss and …