The idea that the final distribution of the tax burden (economic incidence) does not depend on the initial distribution of tax liabilities (statutory incidence) is referred to as the Liability Side Equivalence principle. This paper tests this principle in the laboratory and finds that subjects...

The idea that the final distribution of the tax burden (economic incidence) does not depend on the initial distribution of tax liabilities (statutory incidence) is referred to as the Liability Side Equivalence principle. This paper tests this principle in the laboratory and finds that subjects...

This paper studies a simple setting in which the contractual arrangements which determine the incentives for agents are not designed by a single central planner, but are themselves the outcome of a game among multiple non-cooperatively acting principals. The notion of an Epsilon Contracting...

This paper derives optimal bribes to reduce upstream transfrontier emissions in the presence of asymmetric information on the polluter's concern for the environment. In a model in which the starting point for the negotiations on emission reduction is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, it is shown that...

This paper derives optimal bribes to reduce upstream transfrontier emissions in the presence of asymmetric information on the polluter's concern for the environment. In a model in which the starting point for the negotiations on emission reduction is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, it is shown that...

This paper studies a simple setting in which the contractual arrangements which determine the incentives for agents are not designed by a single central planner, but are themselves the outcome of a game among multiple non-cooperatively acting principals. The notion of an Epsilon Contracting...

This paper adopts the incomplete contracting perspective to study a firm's continuous choice between producing an essential input in-house (full integration), buying it from an outside supplier (non-integration) and doing a combination of both (tapered integration), when (i) an idiosyncratic...