additional episodes of questionable, improper, and possibly illegal actions by managers of financial institutions. By combining … techniques used in financial analysis and theoretical constructs of the study of managerial fraud, the Analytic Model of … Management Fraud is developed. The conceptual framework reflected in the Analytic Model of Management Fraud is that financial …

The financial statement fraud (management fraud) occurred in three different ways: lack of awareness of acting … (individual's intuition support committing a fraud), or awareness of acting fraudulently coupled with reasoning through cost …-benefit analysis (individual's intuition unclear). The management fraud can be viewed as a decisional, behavioral, cognitive, societal …

of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure …-owned enterprise controlling shareholders' incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of … economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud …

of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure …-owned enterprise controlling shareholders' incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of … economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud …

’s likelihood of financial reporting fraud, we restudy their relationship using innovative research methods. First, we concentrate … violations. Moreover, the effect of option incentives on financial reporting fraud is moderated by auditor effort. In addition …

associated with a three-fold higher likelihood of corporate fraud and that the association is attenuated for firms with stronger …

risk of corporate fraud. Appointment-based CEO connectedness in executive suites and boardrooms increases the likelihood of … committing fraud and decreases the likelihood of detection. Additionally, it decreases expected costs of fraud by helping to … conceal frauds, making CEO dismissal less likely upon fraud discovery, and lowering the coordination costs of carrying out …

-based compensation due to the high level of fraud that managers would undertake. The principal findings are (1) fraud can be a sign of …I show that heeding recent calls to reduce agency costs and managerial short-termism may, in fact, lead to more fraud … both effort and some level of fraud. Where agency costs are large, shareholders will be unwilling to award performance …

This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly … negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010 …. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the firm's owners and the board of directors penalize CEOs for fraud …