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Special issue title: exploring Coase's world

Nicita, Antonio (contributor) - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009570183

The political determinants of liberalization : do ideological cleavages still matter?

Belloc, Filippo; Nicita, Antonio - In: International review of economics : journal of civil economy 58 (2011) 2, pp. 121-145

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009153917

Essential facility access in Europe : building a test for antitrust policy

Castaldo, Angelo; Nicita, Antonio - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 3 (2007) 1, pp. 83-110

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009424451

Property, liability and market power : the antitrust side of copyright

Nicita, Antonio; Ramello, Giovanni B. - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 3 (2007) 3, pp. 767-791

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009428363

Disentangling liberalization and privatization policies : is there a political trade-off?

Belloc, Filippo; Nicita, Antonio; Sepe, Simone M. - In: Journal of comparative economics : the journal of the … 42 (2014) 4, pp. 1033-1051

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011299371

Incomplete contracts and competition: another look at fisher body/general motors?

Nicita, Antonio; Sepe, Simone M. - In: European journal of law and economics 34 (2012) 3, pp. 495-514

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009692110

The costs of avoiding accicdents : selective compliance and the "Peltzman effect" in Italy

Benedettini, Simona; Nicita, Antonio - In: International review of law and economics 32 (2012) 2, pp. 256-270

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657442

Dixit versus Williamson: the ‘fundamental transformation’ reconsidered

Nicita, Antonio; Vatiero, Massimiliano - In: European journal of law and economics 37 (2014) 3, pp. 439-453

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010364663

IN DUBIO PRO REO : behavioral explanations of pro-defendant bias in procedures (Law and economics)

Nicita, Antonio; Rizzolli, Matteo - In: CESifo economic studies : CESifo, a joint initiative of … 60 (2014) 3, pp. 554-580

The standard model of optimal deterrence predicts that the probability of wrongful conviction of the innocent is, at the margin, as detrimental to deterrence as the probability of wrongful acquittal of guilty individuals. We extend the model in several directions: using expected utility as well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010466902

Lost in transaction? : il Nobel a Oliver Williamson e il problema del governo delle relazioni economiche

Nicita, Antonio; Napolitano, Giulio - In: Mercato concorrenza regole 12 (2010) 1, pp. 77-114

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008759259